During the evening of 5 Sept., a Laksaur militia leader, Olivio Moruk Mendoça, had been murdered in Betun District. The militia in Betun had been identified as a principal source of trouble throughout West Timor and had recently been associated with cross-border raids as well as the killing of two peacekeepers in East Timor. Following the killing, Laksaur members made it known that they would march in Atambua the next day to protest the killing of their leader. That same night (5 Sept.), the office in Atambua learned of the planned march.

Early on 6 Sept., Alias Ahmad, Head of Field Office in Atambua, contacted the police and the army to enquire about the danger posed by the march. Both the police and army informed HCR that as the demonstration march was aimed at local government officials, the office had nothing to worry about. Nonetheless, A. Ahmad requested non-essential staff to go home and continued to monitor the movements of the demonstration. The office windows were boarded up as a precautionary measure. At around 11:30 AM, the gate to the office was closed. Nine policemen were stationed in front of the premises. Shortly thereafter, a member of another militia, Aitarak, told the policemen outside the office that the demonstration could turn ugly. The message was passed on to HCR. Preparations for evacuation of those who were still in the office premises, about 15 persons, were begun. Ladders were readied against the backyard wall.

During the next 15 to 20 minutes, a group of some 30 men on motorcycles was spotted arriving at the office. A. Ahmad instructed everyone to leave and escape through the backyard by using the ladders. Pero, Samson, Carlos, Sakusa Raivoce (UN Field Security Officer) and Jesse Ponce (Community Family Services International) were still in the office. Pero was manning the radio, Samson was working on a report and Carlos was presumably sending an e-mail message. At this point, the police, who were unarmed, vanished and the attackers forced their way into the office. Pero was killed. J. Ponce, who had gone to the toilet, managed to get to the roof of the office, jumped over several walls and was able to flee the attackers. Raivoce fought his way to one of the ladders and then fought off other attackers who by now were on the other side of the wall. After this sequence of events, the attackers are presumed to have withdrawn. Samson and Carlos probably hid in the office, waiting for help to arrive. Instead, the attackers re-entered the office and killed both Carlos and Samson. The three bodies were taken out to the street and set afire.

Those who managed to escape, hid in neighbouring houses, waiting for an opportunity to get to safety. The attackers roamed the streets, looking for HCR staff. Prova Borges (Repatriation Officer), who had seen the demonstration from her hotel, barricaded herself in her room and was subsequently helped by a driver to reach the army compound. In another room, a Brazilian free-lance journalist was attacked and left for dead. Abdullah Khan, a UNV working with HCR, was hidden by the owners of a nearby hotel where workers were questioned about the whereabouts of foreigners staying at the hotel. After some time, he was able to reach the army compound by using an army uniform to avoid detection.

Shortly after radio contact was lost with Atambua, the offices in Kupang and Dili (East Timor) requested the assistance of UNTAET and the Peacekeeping Force (PKF). The New Zealand contingent made available three helicopters to rescue HCR staff after they reached the army compound in Atambua. The rescue operation was able to begin at dusk (approx. 5:00 PM) on 6 Sept. The next day, evacuation from Atambua continued and included HCR and NGO local staff and their families. Twenty-four hours later, reports were still being received of militias searching the homes of international and local staff.

F. Fouinat noted that it was more or less known how the killings had taken place but the reasons for the murders remained unknown. What had gone wrong? Could it ever be known? The immediate cause of the killings of our colleagues had been the murder of the militia leader the previous night. One thing seemed certain. The attack was not the result of an outburst of anger by desperate mourners passing in front of the HCR office. The demonstration took place at a nearby location. The motorcycle gang broke off from the demonstration and attacked the office. What could not be known in advance by our colleagues, but in retrospect was clear, was that the attackers had come to kill. The attack had the signs of a premeditated act. It is impossible to say why a link between the murder of the militia leader and HCR was made. Manipulation is one possibility that only a thorough investigation can elucidate, but given the present circumstances in Indonesia, an investigation may not be possible. Local staff who were evacuated said that they had heard a rumour being spread that the killings of our colleagues were in retaliation as HCR had paid for the murder of the militia leader. This information was not available or known to our colleagues in Atambua ahead of the attack on 6 Sept. The PKF had six possible scenarios for the attack but none are considered entirely plausible. It is not even certain that HCR was the sole target as the offices of the ICRC and IOM, fortunately without international staff on that day, were also attacked.

Why had our staff not been evacuated upon hearing of the demonstration? On 12 August, staff were evacuated from Atambua following the receipt of information that a planned demonstration threatened to spiral out of control. The army had blocked the protesters and staff were able to return to Atambua later in the day. The Atambua staff, like their colleagues in Kupang, had experienced many demonstrations and in most incidents, military or police information had played a role in deciding what should be done. 

To comprehend what happened on 6 Sept., it is important to consider events during the weeks which preceded. On 23 Aug., activities were suspended in West Timor following a serious security incident in Kefamenanu. Expatriate staff were withdrawn from the Kefamenanu antenna office and all other offices were placed on essential-staff-only status. There was no evacuation of offices. The decision on 29 Aug. to end the suspension was based on four major considerations. (1) The police had arrested two persons who had attacked colleagues in Kefamenanu. This was the first ever arrest following such incidents. (2) The Government had issued a strong statement condemning the attack. (3) A 22-page joint security plan previously negotiated between HCR and the authorities had been signed shortly after this incident. (4) The anniversary of the popular consultation (30 August 1999) which had resulted in East Timor's present status was reason for concern that the suspension of assistance would aggravate an already charged environment in which the UN was seen as being responsible for making East Timor independent. A large demonstration in Kupang had taken place but it was peaceful. On the same day, the notorious Aitarak leader, Eurico Guterres, had met with the Regional Representative, Rene van Rooyen, and new understanding and a mood of co-operation seemed to be emerging.

A few days before the incident on 6 Sept., staff in Atambua were invited to attend a "socialisation" meeting involving local leaders, the police, military personnel and militia leaders. The result of the encounter had been equally positive and together with the meeting in Kupang, staff were of the opinion that a climate of improved security would ensue.

Staff members were invited to comment and ask questions (in bold).

The militia had reportedly been seen giving an order to a soldier. The policemen guarding the office carried no side arms to effectively protect the office and vanished when the attackers arrived. Moreover, a colleague had to use an army uniform to escape and reach safety. Given these circumstances, how could the army and police be relied on to provide accurate information about the safety of our colleagues? What was the basis for not evacuating earlier or for that matter, resuming activities on 29 August?

The question illustrates the dilemma of whom to trust. Balancing the role of the army and the police with regard to staff security was at best a mixed experience. Complicity between certain elements of the military and militias is a well-known fact. There have been too many incidents during which the army and police have ignored militia acts or have been willing accomplices. However, the army and police had also protected HCR personnel, particularly during repatriation movements. A definite pattern of total negligence on the part of these services could not be readily established.

As for our actions, decisions sometimes had to be made without access to the most reliable information and under considerable pressure. All present at this gathering should try to understand the ordeal faced by colleagues who escaped death in Atambua as well as that of those who had a role or a say regarding the operation in West Timor. They all deserve our support and sympathy.

Collusion in the Balkans had been rampant and HCR had gone out of its way to expose this. There is a feeling that similar efforts were not made in the case of Indonesia. Also, one cannot help but imagine that the tragedy could have cost the lives of 15 instead of just three colleagues. At the time of the killings the presence of the international community in Atambua was apparently small. Was this because other agencies had evacuated or because they were not present at all?

HCR had systematically informed and complained about security incidents throughout its presence in West Timor. In trying to understand the tragedy better, it is important to bear in mind that at the time there were three field security officers in West Timor: one in Atambua and two in Kupang. Elaborate security arrangements were also in place, including communications equipment and related safety procedures. As for collusion, it was not blanket collusion. A. Ahmad had been in Atambua since Oct. 1999 and had developed effective working relationships with the more reliable members of the police and military. The international community has always been small in Atambua, with no more that one or two officers representing IOM, the ICRC, CARE, CRS, CFSI, JRS and one or two missionaries. Some of these officers were also on leave or away from Atambua on 6 Sept., as were many HCR staff.

Kamal Deriche's e-mail message on the incident in Kefamenanu was a strong warning. What was done with this message? Was it properly analysed? If procedures were in place the security officers should have been more active in raising the security phases. If Atambua was in phase 3 and given the animosity toward HCR, why did staff go to the office in the first place?

The notion of gradually increasing security threats which could inevitably lead to fatalities could not be retained. F. Fouinat admitted that although he was aware of all security concerns, nobody had ever envisaged that such a sudden change of behaviour could happen. Reading e-mail messages sent before 6 Sept. within the context of what happened on this day may be understandable, but it is also misleading. Does the Kefamenanu incident imply that we should have known better? F. Fouinat did not believe that this incident foretold the tragedy in Atambua. Prior to the killings HCR had logged some 120 security incidents. Our colleagues had become accustomed to the situation and perhaps even numb to the dangers that surrounded them as they continued to discharge their functions. K. Deriche's message and others that have been seen by staff give an insight into the environment that our colleagues had come to accept in West Timor. F. Fouinat's perception was one of a linear progression of security incidents which, on 6 Sept., suddenly became radically different. In hindsight, the point of no return was perhaps in Oct. 1999, when we first went in. F. Fouinat said that he had drawn one key lesson from the tragedy: field staff could not be left alone to make objective decisions regarding their security. These decisions needed to be second-guessed at various levels, including by the UN in New York. This view was contrary to his 25 years of experience with HCR.

Messages from staff are very moving and telling. They also give the impression that staff were left exposed, without management realising the risks. This was not the case. The reality was much more complex, not a black and white situation. There were as many elements which favoured the continuation of operations as those which signalled the contrary.

Regarding security phases, decisions and the implementation of prevailing security phases in West Timor needed to be reviewed further.

When HCR suspended activities after the Kefamenanu incident on 23 August, the Office was strongly criticised by the UN, NGOs and some governments. Evacuating staff from Atambua could also have been an option. However, this move would have necessitated the simultaneous evacuation of staff in Kupang as what happen in one town almost always had immediate repercussions in the other. From the viewpoint of policy decisions, the presence of HCR was at stake. On 23 Aug., it was not operationally possible to evacuate from Kupang or Atambua.

The DHC took the floor at this juncture to mention that when the ICRC had several of its staff murdered in Chechnya a few years ago, the lesson that it had learned had been that security decisions had to be taken at the field level. This indicated the complexity and range of opinions concerning staff security. The ICRC's view and F. Fouinat's suggestion would have to be considered in a review of operational procedures required after the Atambua tragedy.

With regard to the inquiry, if Indonesia has rejected the Security Council mission, how could HCR's inquiry be feasible and if so, how would it be organised?

The DHC announced that early the following week N. Morris would present the terms of reference for the inquiry he is to undertake. This inquiry would look at HCR procedures.

The issue of security thresholds is again foremost in the minds of HCR staff. At the heart of the matter is at what point should staff be evacuated and who makes such a decision?

F. Fouinat said that before 6 Sept. he never thought of withdrawing from West Timor. Security threats and associated risks had, in his view, been more acute in the October to December 1999 period than during the past few weeks. While before 6 Sept. he had not previously considered a complete withdrawal from West Timor, measures to scale down the operation had been envisaged in the event of continuing security difficulties. In mid-July, a security incident involving the Kupang Head of Sub-Office had resulted in HCR notifying the Indonesian Government that unless the situation changed in the following three months, HCR would reassess its presence. This approach was also justified given the difficulties encountered in gaining access to the refugees and the effects this was having on the discharge of our protection responsibilities.

The DHC mentioned that the issue of a threshold was not just about security but also how the organisation could gain access to the refugees. In many operations around the world today HCR did not have access to refugees.

With regard to the evacuation in Atambua, how could two ladders have been sufficient for 15 staff? Why had only three colleagues stayed in their homes? And why had the cars been moved to a safe place instead of being left at the office for use in an evacuation?

F. Fouinat said that these issues needed to be reviewed during the course of the inquiry. He nevertheless stated that in his view, if the staff in Atambua had stayed at home, they would have been equally exposed to danger as the killers had subsequently carried out a manhunt by going to staff residences.

The issue of safe thresholds starts with decisions at Headquarters. Was this taken into account when staff were assigned to posts in West Timor in Oct. 1999? Was this done when people like the questioner were sent to the Great Lakes region several years ago? Should staff be placed in situations in which they may misjudge events involving their security as colleagues did in Atambua?

The DHC indicated that the AHC's review of field security would have to examine these concerns.

F. Fouinat noted that his principal motivation to initiate this emergency operation had been providing protection and assistance to refugees in West Timor.

If on the previous day of the killings (5 Sept.) a militia leader had been murdered and his body mutilated, would it not have been reasonable to believe that the murderers would come after others? How could other international agencies simply "evaporate" from Atambua?

F. Fouinat said that he had already answered these questions to the best of his knowledge. 

The DHC informed staff that he had spoken with a senior IOM official and had asked him about the absence of staff from his organisation in Atambua at the time of the killings. The officer had told the DHC that he did not know why IOM staff had left the town. N. Morris would have to look at this issue as well. The DHC asked that staff avoid concluding prematurely that there had been negligence on the part of those concerned. In such instances, there would always be gaping holes.

HCR's management of information and knowledge regarding operations is not good. Moreover, political analysis is not one of its strengths. The poor quality or lack of intelligence was most recently exemplified by the tragedy in Guinea. Five days after the kidnapping of a colleague, HCR could not say anything about the person's well-being or whereabouts.

Was there any current discussion about resuming operations in West Timor and under what basis?

F. Fouinat indicated that such a discussion would not take place for the time being. A river of blood ran between HCR and West Timor. Before such a move could be entertained, the Indonesian Government would have to: (1) conduct a full and satisfactory investigation into the deaths of our colleagues and the attackers would have to be brought to justice; (2) disarm, dismantle and relocate all militia groups to areas outside West Timor; and, (3) restore law and order throughout West Timor. Moreover, phase 5 prevailed in West Timor and the UN Secretariat would have to pronounce itself with regard to the downgrading or lifting of the security phases. HCR remained present in Jakarta but staff could rest assured that the Office would not leave any stone unturned in the pursuit of justice. Indonesia should also be asked for reparations. Let there be no doubt about those who were responsible for this tragedy: they were those who had killed our colleagues and, to a lesser extent, those who failed to protect them. 

If HCR personnel are to continue taking risks to carry out their work, the tragedy in Atambua demonstrates that the Office must have a highly responsive rescue capacity. Was such a capacity envisaged or would staff have to rely on ladders for their safety?

The DHC said that HCR did not have such a means as the suggestion implied considerable resources. A state of the art rescue capacity could not be implemented at the expense of protection and assistance activities.

The DHC thanked F. Fouinat and all present for engaging in a dialogue of such importance. He asked that all staff participate in upcoming discussions on field security and other issues pertaining to staff safety.

F. Fouinat said that he remained at the disposal of the staff to answer additional queries.

The meeting, attended by over 250 staff members at Headquarters, adjourned at 5:40 PM.